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The Functional Roles of Attention 
 




Though it is widely agreed that attention and consciousness are distinct phenomena with 
functionally and anatomically distinct, underlying neural substrates (Crick & Koch, 2003; 
Kentridge et al. 2004; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007), there is less consensus about what the 
functional role of attention is and how it relates to consciousness. Here we argue that two main 
functions of visual attention are to enhance the precision of visual representations and to 
modulate the informational input to the visual system, leading to visual representations with a 
greater chance of tracking properties in the external world. 
 




1. Neural Architecture and Neural Coding of Information 
 
When confronted with a new visual scene we need to interpret it in terms of objects in the world, 
not the retinal image. How might attention help us achieve this? Let us consider some 
implications of broad principles of the neural architecture and neural coding of information in the 
visual system. 
 
The architectural principle we want to stress concerns systematic changes in the receptive field 
properties of cells as we move from primary visual cortex along the ventral visual stream moving 
into the temporal lobe towards the temporal pole (see e.g. Gross, Rocha-Miranda & Bender, 
1972). In primary visual cortex receptive field sizes are small and the properties that receptive 
fields are tuned for are simple. As we move along the ventral stream receptive fields become 
larger and tuning properties more complex. Towards the rostral end of the temporal lobe we 
might find cells which are tuned to respond selectively to specific body parts which have 
receptive fields spanning nearly an entire hemifield. Consider the size of a hand, a face or 
indeed any other object that these cells might be tuned for. These objects almost always 
subtend visual angles much smaller than a hemifield. How then can a cell with a much larger 
receptive field respond selectively to an object when it seems it should be driven, directly or 
indirectly, not only by signals from the object but also by signals from a large area of space 
surrounding the object? We can only achieve this if, at levels of the visual system where 
receptive field are small, signals from the space surrounding the object are suppressed. Is it 
possible that this is what attention is for? 
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Consider what we know about the effects of attention on the response properties of cells in the 
visual system. In the earliest and best known experiment on the effects of attention on the 
receptive field properties of cells in the visual system (Moran & Desimone, 1985) the effect of 
attending to a particular object is to effectively shrink an initially large receptive field around the 
attended object so another object nearby in space no longer affects the cell’s responses. 
Changes induced by attention on the effective size, shape and position of receptive fields have 
been demonstrated repeatedly since. Reynolds & Desimone (1999) suggest that attentional 
shrinkage of receptive fields around attended objects serves to solve the binding problem. As 
only features in the region of space specifically occupied by the object of attention can induce 
responses in receptive fields shrunk around the object this means that errors attributing features 
belonging to other objects in nearby space to the object of attention (illusory conjunctions) are 
no longer possible. The problem of illusory conjunctions is essentially the same as the problem 
of ensuring that a cell with a large receptive field and complex tuning is not subject to 
interference from features within its receptive field other than those belonging to the object of 
attention.  
  
What then should we make of the consequences of attending for the sensitivity of cells that 
appear to have been demonstrated behaviourally (e.g. Carrasco et al, 2004) or 
electrophysiologically (e.g. McAdams & Maunsell, 1999)? There is little doubt that attention 
alters the gain (but probably not sharpness of tuning) of cellular responses to stimuli. One might 
anticipate that the perceptual consequence of this would be a change in apparent properties of 
an attended object. This need not, however, be the case. The broad principle of neural coding I 
want to stress is that representations are generally encoded in a distributed fashion. It is the 
relative strength (or even relative timing) of responses across multiple cells that encodes 
information, not the response of individual cells. So, if we increase the gain of all cells within a 
selected region of space then we do not necessarily affect the property coded across those 
cells. The relative activities elicited by a stimulus should remain similar even if the absolute 
amounts of activity all increase. It is possible that the increase in gains might improve the signal 
to noise ratio of responses to the attended object. The most likely consequence, however, is, 
that by virtue of inhibitory interactions, the response of cells whose gain is not enhanced by 
attention will be suppressed by a ‘winner take all’ mechanism (see e.g. Desimone & Duncan, 
1996; Lee, Itti, Koch & Braun, 1999). What then might be happening in behavioural tasks that 
claim to show that the appearance of attended items is altered? One possibility is that the 
receptive fields of cells responding to the non-attended items remain large and so their 
responses continue to be influenced by aspects of the stimulus other than the object of interest. 
With a uniform surrounding background the effect is to ‘dilute’ the effect of matches between the 
properties of the unattended object and cells’ tuning. The appearance of attended and 
unattended items may therefore truly differ but there is no ambiguity about the veridical 
properties of stimuli. Ned Block (2010) suggested that we adopt a view of phenomenal 
experience dubbed ‘mental paint’ in order to deal with the uncertainty over what constitutes a 
veridical phenomenal experience that Carrasco’s experiments on the alteration of experience by 
attention might imply. If, as we suggest here, attention serves to increase the veridicality of 
experience then we can discard mental paint. 
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In the account above attention serves to optimise the veridicality of responses of cells involved 
in coding complex properties of stimuli. Such optimised responses might be used to engage 
action, but there is no necessity for this. We might need to know about an object for many 
reasons that do not involve directing actions towards it (e.g. in order to remember it, something 
it is hard to credit as being ‘action’). Similarly, once the identity of an object has been 
established as best it can, it may be that it is deemed irrelevant and is not subject to any further 
processing in terms of memory, planning or action. If consciousness is associated with this 
deeper processing (as global workspace and allied theories hold) then it is clear that it might be 
necessary to attend to an object for it to enter consciousness but attention is not sufficient - not 
all attended items need enter consciousness. 
 
 
2. Further Evidence for Selection for Precision 
 
Further evidence for the idea that a function of attention is to facilitate enhanced perceptual 
precision comes from the case of type-2 blindsight. Blindsight is a kind of residual vision found 
in people with lesions to V1. Subjects with blindsight typically report no visual awareness, but 
they are nonetheless able to make above-chance guesses about the shape, location, color and 
movement of visual stimuli presented to them in their blind field. Type-2 blindsight is a kind of 
residual vision found in patients with V1 lesions in the presence of some residual awareness 
(see e.g. Foley & Kentridge, 2015).  
 
Studies indicate that the attributes experienced in type-2 blindsight are less determinate than 
the properties experienced in ordinary vision. When shown different letters, blindsight subject 
DB would sometimes report being aware of the direction of the stimulus and having a feeling of 
whether the stimulus was ‘smooth’ (the O) or ‘jagged’ (the X) (Weiskrantz, et al., 1974). When 
strongly encouraged to provide an answer, blindsight subject KP described experiencing ‘a very 
faint flash’ in response to stimuli (Weiskrantz, 1980), and blindsight subject JP reported being 
aware of ill-defined and poorly formed ‘blobs’ when words were flashed in her blind field 
(Shefrin, et al. 1988). Several subjects have reported having feelings of ‘something’ or 
‘something happening’ (Weiskrantz, 1986). These reports testify to the hypothesis that the 
properties that subjects are aware of in their blind field in type-2 blindsight are determinables (as 
opposed to determinate properties, such as red and square), sometimes of the most general 
kind (‘something’, ‘something happening’). 
 
The reason type-2 blindsight differs from ordinary visual experience in this respect is likely that it 
is generated by an alternative visual pathway that bypasses V1. Morland, et al. (1999) 
investigated blindsight subject GY’s ability to make luminance matches in his hemianopic field 
and between both hemifields. They found that GY was able to make matches when the stimuli 
were presented in the blind field but was unable to establish matches based on luminance when 
the stimuli were presented in opposing fields. A plausible explanation of this observation is that 
the perceived luminance of the stimuli in his blind field (perception of brightness) is derived from 
direct projections from subcortical areas to extrastriate areas bypassing V1, whereas the 
perceived luminance of the stimuli in his intact field originate in the normal visual pathway that 
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includes V1. This would make it possible for him to compare stimuli on the basis of luminance 
when both are presented in the hemianopic field, but when the stimuli are presented to 
opposing fields, the distinct pathways would yield different kinds of percepts, making lawful 
matching difficult. This indicates that V1 plays a crucial role in generating brightness perception. 
And if GY’s type-2 blindsight vision fails to be fine-grained, this further suggests that brightness 
perception is required for generating conscious awareness of determinate properties. 
 
The latter observation allows us to draw some connections between enhanced perceptual 
precision and attention. Neurophysiological studies have shown that attentional modulation and 
changes in the luminance of a stimulus can create identical modulations of firing rates 
(Carrasco, et al., 2004). It has also been found that attentional modulation and the intensity of 
the brightness of a stimulus may have a shared underlying mechanism (Treue, 2001). This 
points to a neural mechanism according to which attention modulates the strength of a stimulus 
by altering its perceived luminance, or brightness. 
 
But if attentional modulation and changes in luminance have a shared neural mechanism, then 
we can provide an argument for the view that attentional modulation yields a difference in the 
determinacy of the perceived attributes. Neurophysiological evidence points to a defect in 
brightness perception in type-2 blindsight. Brightness perception is likely compromised because 
type-2 blindsight takes place via a visual pathway that bypasses V1, a region that may be 
associated with generating brightness percepts. It also appears that only highly determinable 
(as opposed to determinate) properties are consciously represented in type-2 blindsight. This 
then suggests that when the mechanism for generating brightness is compromised, then visual 
experience cannot consciously represent very determinate properties.  
 
These considerations suggest that a possible function of attention may be to modulate the 
strength of a stimulus by altering its perceived luminance, or brightness, and thereby making the 
perceptual experience more precise. 
 
 
3. Prevention of Informational Overload 
 
Modulating the strength of a stimulus by altering its perceived brightness is only one function of 
attention. Another function appears to be to prevent informational overload by selecting relevant 
information and filtering out irrelevant information from crowded visual scenes. For the case of 
vision, it has been found that attention can modulate responses in extrastriate and striate visual 
cortex and even LGN (O’Connor, et al., 2002) and in that way affect the nature of our visual 
experiences. It has been reported to do this in three different ways. Attention enhances neural 
responses to attended stimuli, attenuates responses to ignored stimuli and increases the 
baseline activity in the anticipation of visual stimulation (Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007). 
 
Independent evidence that a role of attention is to prevent informational overload comes from 
the case of hallucinogens (psilocybin, LSD, mescaline). The mushroom-derived hallucinogen 
psilocybin--one of the most selective hallucinogenic drugs studied--has been shown to 
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significantly reduce subjects’ attentional tracking ability, although it has no significant effect on 
spatial working memory (Carter, et al. 2006). A possible mechanism for how psilocybin affects 
attentional tracking can be identified by looking closer at how this chemical generates drug-
induced hallucinations.  
 
It is by now fairly well established that psilocybin is a potent partial agonists at serotonin 5-
HT1A/2A/2C receptors, with serotonin 5-HT2A receptor activation directly correlated with 
hallucinogenic activity (Glennon, 1990; Vollenweider et al., 1998; Nichols, 2004; Presti and 
Nichols, 2004). Though the mechanism of action varies for different hallucinogens, it is believed 
that 5-HT2A receptor activation of cortical neurons is responsible for mediating the signaling 
pattern and behavioral response to hallucinogens (Presti and Nichols, 2004; González-Maeso et 
al., 2007).  
 
The activation of the cortical serotonergic system does not fully explain the perceptual effects of 
psychedelic drugs, as not all 5-HT2A agonists have an excitatory mechanism of action and not 
all 5-HT2A agonists have psychedelic effects (e.g., methysergide). So, this raises the question 
of what other factors need to be present for drug-induced hallucinations to occur when subjects 
are under the influence of psilocybin.  
 
A promising suggestion for how psilocybin and other similar hallucinogenic drugs is associated 
with visual hallucinatory effects is that it activates layer V pyramidal neurons in the visual cortex, 
which engage in gating functions in communication between the cortex and the thalamus 
(Barkai and Hasselmo, 1994; Brogaard, 2013). When a hallucinogen binds to 5-HT2A serotonin 
receptor on layer V pyramidal neurons, this gives rise to an excitatory response via increased 
release of the excitatory neurotransmitter glutamate (Scruggs et al., 2003; Nichols, 2004; Ceglia 
et al., 2004; Torres-Escalante et al., 2004).  
 
Now, 5-HT2A serotonin receptors are found on both layer V glutamatergic neurons and 
GABAergic interneurons that connect the visual cortex to the thalamus (Lee and Roth, 2012). 
There is also a direct activation of GABAergic interneurons through the synapses of pyramidal 
cells onto the interneurons (Markram et al., 2004). So, a large excitatory response in a 
pyramidal neuron will lead to a large inhibitory response in the interneuron. As GABAergic 
interneurons inhibit the brain regions they project to, this will inhibit the normal gating 
mechanisms of the thalamus, allowing too much information to enter the visual cortex. 
 
This points to a mechanism where psilocybin affects attentional tracking by allowing an 
informational overload of neural information to enter the visual cortex. The additional neural 
information available to the visual cortex includes both irrelevant information that is normally 
filtered out as well as random neural activity generated by the thalamus. Drug-induced 
hallucinations are generated when the brain attempts to make sense of random or irrelevant 
activity from the thalamus. If this mechanism for how hallucinations may occur under the 
influence of psilocybin is correct, then that suggests a possible role of selective attention as a 
modulator of informational input. A function of attention may be to prevent informational 
overload from the thalamus to sensory cortical areas. This sort of overload would lead to a loss 
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in the tracking abilities of perceptual representations, as the perceptual representations would 
be a partial result of the brain’s attempt to make sense of random and irrelevant information. So, 
another way of formulating this role of attention is in terms of veridicality. We might say that 
attention serves to optimize the veridicality of conscious perceptual representations. 
 
 
4. Attention for Action? 
 
Wayne Wu (2014) has argued that attention is for action. More precisely: attention is selection 
that guides task performance. According to Wu, for some modality M (perceptual, cognitive), 
  
If a subject S M-selects X to guide performance of task T, then S M-attends to X. 
  
Wu refers to this as an ‘empirically sufficient condition’. Action suffices for attention. Although 
Wu also argues that action is necessary for attention, this condition by itself is perfectly 
consistent with the view that attention has more than one function. One may think of ‘attention’ 
as semantically on a par with 'tool'. To a first approximation, the meaning of 'tool' is 'a device 
held in the hand used to carry out a particular function'. But there are many different functions 
tools can play. The same goes for attention. As far as we are concerned, one function/purpose 
of attention could, in principle, be ‘for action' (task-related). This does not rule out that attention 
can also be selection for precision or modulation of informational input. Increased precision and 
modulation of informational input may be used to engage action or improve action performance 
but there is no requirement that action is engaged as a result of the optimized responses. A 
precise perceptual representation of an object may be generated only to be judged to be 
irrelevant and as a result never undergo further processing for memory, thought, planning or 
action. 
 
Here, of course, it is important that we don’t read the suggestion that attention is selection for 
precision and modulation of informational input as the claim that enhanced perceptual precision 
and modulation of visual input require attention. If your spouse turns on the light in the room, 
this will increase the precision of your visual representation. But this sort of increase in precision 
does not require any additional attentional selection on your part. Likewise, if your spouse 
replaces most items in the room with uni-colored patches, she will in some sense have 
modulated how much visual information enters into your visual system. But this type of 
modulation does not require any additional attentional modulation on your part.  
 
How then are we to understand the claim that attention functions to select for precision and 
modulate informational input? For the case of vision, the claim is best understood in terms of 
top-down influences on neural processes in the visual cortex and on neural regions to which the 
visual cortex projects or from which it receives neural input. Without attentional top-down 
influences on the visual processes, brightness perception will be remarkably reduced and any 
conscious visual representation will be notably less precise. Likewise, without the top-down 
attentional selection of input from the thalamus to the visual cortex, the conscious visual 
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representation that is generated in the visual cortex will be intermingled with hallucinatory 
elements that do not track reality.  
 
It may be argued that one could, in principle, artificially mirror the effects of selective attention 
by directly manipulating the computation of brightness and the informational flow from the 
thalamus. This is no doubt correct but it doesn’t affect the functional claim we are making. A 
functional role of a mental process is a set of causes and effects that surround a mental 
process. Specifying a functional role of a mental process thus does not require that we identify a 
set of mental processes for which the target mental process is required. The aim is to identify a 
set of causes and effects in a normal brain in normal conditions. As such, it can be a functional 
role of attention to increase precision and modulate informational input, even if not every 
conceivable enhancement of perceptual precision or modulation of informational input requires 
attention. 
 
Now, it is plausible that a functional role of attention could be given, where attention simply is 
understood as the underlying processes that satisfy the specified functional roles. This is a 
stronger claim, however. It commits us to a conception of radically different underlying 
processes that satisfy the functional roles as attentional selectional processes. For example,we 
can imagine that a microchip could be inserted into the visual system of people whose neural 
systems don’t prevent informational overflow and play the role that attention plays in 
neurotypical individuals. On a functional analysis of attention, this microchip would then not 
simply play the role of attention. The microchip would be (part of) the attentional system.  
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